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Reply Brief of Duck Creek Irrigation Company,
a Corporation
Statement of the Case
The respondent, Angus H. Bishop, does not attempt
to restate the facts under his heading, "Additional Statement of the Case"; while conceding that appellant's statement contains an abstract of a substantial part of the evi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

dence received at the trial, he contends that much favorable to respondent i~ omitted and that the recitation is
more favorable to appellant than the record as a whole
warrants. We challenge the latter contentions and submit
that our abstract of the evidence fairly shows in substantially the words of the witnesses the purport of the record
on the controlling points in issue.
We do not think it is an answer for responde~t to make
the bare assertions indicated in his opening "Additional
Statement of the Case," and as we shall hereinafter point
out in reply to the remainder of respondent's brief, nowhere
is there evidence cited which indicates anything but a complete failure of proof on respondent's part to show any valid
appropriation from the Duck Creek Dam whatsoever prior
to 1903 or the acquisition of any right whatsoever by adverse possession or otherwise subsequent thereto.
Without repeating the Statement of Facts appearing
on pages 2 to 57 of our original brief, we point out that the
evidence of the various witnesses, including those called
by respondent, show without conflict that appellant's position is correct. The detailed statement was made necessary by respondent's generalizations throughout the course
of this proceedings which are only plausible if the record
itself is disregarded.
We now specifically refer to the points argued by the
respondent.
Trial court supplied with a transcript of the evidence and
view,ed the premises.
This is true. The view of the premises was not evidence, and occurred in June, 1946, more than four years
prior to the findings. Such a cursory view could not add
or detract from the evidence and we do not believe it would
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mean as much to the trial court as pictures available in
evidence at this time. Certainly it would be completely
meaningless in determining what the use of water was prior to 1903 and certainly it would be ineffectual in changing Stevens' testimony, on which respondent's case must
entirely rest, that between 1906 when he began to farm
as the predecessor in interest of respondent and 1944 when
he sold out, he never questioned the right of Duck Creek to
all of the low water; that he never claimed any water from
the Upper Dam and only twice even in high water did he
attempt to take the flash board out of the Lower Damonce in 1922 and once in 1927-and on both occasions, they
were immediately replaced and he took no further action.
While the trial court did have available the transcript,
the generalities of respondent's argument similar to those
indulged in his brief were obviously accepted by the trial
court without adequate check, an error which has made
necessary this appeal and which does not justify a repetition on this appeal wherein the facts, as well as the law,
are to be reviewed.
An example of the specious nature of respondent's argument in this regard is indicated in his closing statement
under this heading, (p. 5), "If by a view of the premises it
appeared that the ditches were on high ridges running
through the property of plaintiffs, such fact would be convincing proof that the same were for irrigation and not for
drainage purposes - - - if old ditches were so located that
they would serve no useful purpose except as a means of
irrigating plaintiff's land, such fact would add considerable
weight and might well justify the trial court in making a
finding that otherwise would not be justified by the cold
record of the evidence. (Emphasis ours)
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This statement tacitly concedes that the record does
not justify the assumptions advanced. But it is not even
claimed that a view would disclose any such things, as indeed it would not, and the assumptions are in direct conflict with the evidence which shows that the land in this
lower area was comparatively level, and that the ditches
were used merely as drainage to get the water off the upper land in high water (T. 197-698, 623-624, 685, 687). The
only exception was a ditch that Andrew J. Stewart made
to take water through a flume across Duck Creek from
the Big Spring area to land now owned by LaVon Payne.
This flume water was supplemented at times with Duck
Creek water, and this apparently is the basis of respondent's claim to the use of water on his land prior to 1903.
Yet, the record is undisputed that this was land not of plaintiff's predecessors, which was referred to as land marked
on Exhibit A in red but was land to the east marked in
white, which now belongs to LaVon Payne whose limited
award respondent now questions (T. 481, 488, 490).
The evidence does not show that plaintiff's premises were
irrigated from the Duck Creek Dam or coursed through
ditc~ therefrom leading to his land before 1903 or at all;
on the contrary, the undisputed evidence expressly refutes
this contention, except as Stevens after 1906 used high or
surplus water.
Under the heading in respondent's brief of which the
foregoing statement is the antithesis, respondent has cited
no evidence in the record which supports his position, and
none can be cited.
The opening argument of law, with respect to a prior
intent to appropriate has no bearing in this case, for any
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high water use made by Stevens after he came onto the
land in 1906 had no relation whatsoever to any previous
use, and he admitted that he knew nothing about any use,
or attempted use, prior to 1906. Had there been any intent to use water on the land in question in the 1880's as
respondent now seems to contend, it would be unsupportable doctrine that almost a generation later a flood water
use by Stevens could relate back to such intent. But the
fact is that no intent in regard to plaintiff's land, as distinguished from land of the defendant, LaVon Payne, was
ever even suggested in the record.
Now turning specifically to the contention of respondent that there was a use of water on his land prior to 1903,
respondent's only reference to Ray Stevens' testimony on
this point is on pages 14, 15 and 22 of the transcript. On
page 14, Stevens testified that ditches he described were
on the land ever since he could remember, which would be
from the time he was ten years old. On page 15, he testified water was coursed through them ever since he could
remember. He was sixty years old at the time of the trial.
But when he was asked through which ditches water was
coursed he answered, "I have taken wateP out here and
" Obviously he was
down the ditch to my land .
talking about after 1906 when he first began to farm in
that vicinity. This is made certain on page 22, when he
was asked:
"Q. When was that to your knowledge first irrigated by water that comes from the Duck Creek
Dam?
"A. Well, I can't say that anybody irrigated that
before that but I have watered down there every year
since the year 1906.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
"Q. And do you know whether there was water
used there before that?
"A. Well, I presume Stewart did but I couldn't
say whether or not he did.
"Q. I think you said you were down in that area
for how many years before 1906?
"A. Well, I have been skating down through
there when I was ten years· old. Of course that was in
the wintertime then."

How can an appropriation be based upon such testimony? What quantity? What acreage? What duty?
What period?
Stevens' testimony cited by respondent, as his other
testimony, just does not support any use prior to 1906,
much less any appropriation. As against this, we have
cited numerous portions of Stevens' testimony showing that
the only use that he made of Duck Creek water from the
Duck Creek Dam was excess or high water after 1906, and
he admitted that prior to his buying the land in 1906 his
visits were casual and he didn't have any water right in
mind (T. 121) and that he knew that the other users on
Duck Creek over the years from the time he went there
in 1906 had been using the water practically at all times,
that there was a dam there in 1906 and that by the reputation the users had all the water at the Upper Duck Creek
and the Lower Duck Creek users were having trouble about
that (T. 157-158).
The William Betts testimony cited by respondent on
pages 179 to 181 of the transcript fails to show any use of
water on what can be identified as plaintiff's land at any
time. The oats and barley he remembered being irrigated
on the Andrew J. Stewart property were just west of the
Jackson Stewart home (T. 180) which is considerably east
of plaintiff's land and although he said the ditch extended
west about eighty rods he did not testify that anything
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was irrigated beyond the vicinity of the Jackson Stewart
home, which is far from the east boundary of plaintiff's
property.
The only other evidence cited by respondent on this
point is that of one referred to by respondent as "A. J.
Stewart," who was really J. W. Stewart, Andrew Stewart
being deceased at the time of the trial. A relatively few
pages of J. W. Stewart's testimony are cited by respondent in a very cursory treatment. For the substance of his
entire testimony, reference is made to pages 26 to 33 of
our original brief.
None of respondent's references define the land on
which Duck Creek water was used as any part of the land
now belonging to plaintiff. On the contrary, the witness
expressly stated that he saw no water used as far west as
plaintiff's land (T. 480-481) and said that the land watered
was south of the racetrack pasture and east of it, a little
farther east from the land painted in green, red and black
on plaintiff's Exhibit A (T. 473) and that the white tract
immediately east of the red and green was where the water was put (T. 181). He further testified that this was the
land now belonging to LaVon Payne-the Eliza Stewart
land-(T. 181) and he further testified that when water
was used even east of the red on the map it was early in
the Spring when there was lots of water all over the country and that when they were irrigating from the dam there
was none coming down there (T. 490).
These are some of the references which respondent
cites, but they are in direct conflict with his claims.
In short, the only evidence of an old use on which
plaintiff relies refers not to plaintiff's land but to land east
of such land, being that now owned by LaVon Payne, and
the record can be searched in vain for any testimony of the
irrigation of other land in that vicinity. It is true that
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even that irrigation was during excess or high water (T.
490) but how then can plaintiff support his claim to an appropriation of a low-water right on his land when the evidence on which he relies shows that the use was on other
land, and was a high or excess water use when the irrigation season had not commenced for the predecessors in
interest of the Duck Creek Irrigation Company at the Duck
Creek Dams?
Based on this and other evidence, the trial court
awarded LaVon Payne a high water right which respondent in his brief questions. We will hereafter refer to this
again, but here suffice it to say that if, as plaintiff claims,
the evidence showing this early high water use on the
LaVon Payne land not included in the Duck Creek incorporation does not authorize the award of a high-water right
to Payne, how could it authorize the award of a low-water
right to plaintiff whose land was not even involved?
The water from the Springs north of Payson is sufficient
to water all of plaintiff's pasture land and there was no
occasion to award plaintiff any water from Duck Crook
even as a hi'h water ri,ht.
Respondent argues "that the evidence shows that the
water from the Springs north of Payson is not available
for the irrigation of the easterly part of plaintiff's land and
therefore if respondent is deprived from securing water
diverted at the Duvk Creek Dam, the easterly part of plaintiff's property will be rendered valueless."
The only use of Duck Creek water shown on the easterly part of plaintiff's property was high or excess .water
before the beginning of the irrigation season and almost
entirely since 1906. His land will be equally as valuable
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by a recognition of the rights of the Duck Creek Irrigation
Company herein as it ever was, but what he is seeking to
do is to take appellant's water to make it more valuable.
The thirty acres of grain which Stevens admitted was the
only cultivated land he watered since he began farming in
1903 was, and is, served by a Strawberry water right independent of Duck Creek.
As to his westerly land served from the Stevens Dam,
and under which it is claimed, and the court found, one
hundred acres of pasture land was irrigated, there was no
justification of awarding anything from Duck Creek Dam
and certainly not a low-water right as the lower court in
effect has done. The flow of water from the Big Springs
area, entering Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam,
according to Stevens, as we pointed out in our principal
brief, averages about two second feet, and this is adequate
to provide for this pasture land. It requires no water over
the Duck Creek Dam, and such water was never used by
Stevens except during high periods when the water could
not be used up above. The evidence shows that after the
first of May, the Duck Creek Irrigation Company has required all the normal flow, and even then there has been insufficient water to provide for the cultivated lands of its
stockholders.
Respondent mentions Jacob's measurements on June
15th, 1946, showing that only 1.13 second feet was coming
in below the Duck Creek Dam for Stevens and he argues
that this was insufficient for one hundred acres of pasture
land; without mentioning the measurements up above, he
infers that the Duck Creek Irrigation Company at the same
time had more than a reasonable share.. The amount of
water then being diverted at the Upper Dam was .84 of a
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second foot (T. 439) and the water at the Duck Creek Dam
was 2.01, or a total of 2.85 at both dams for all the land
of all of the Duck Creek stockholders, comprising well in
excess of four hundred acres. This was, ,according to the
evidence, unusually low water for the time of the year, but
it meant that even as the water has always been used before at this stage of the flow, with the company having a
complete priority during the irrigation season, at, and
above, the Duck Creek Dam, Stevens for one hundred acres
of pasture land was getting 1.13 second feet while for more
than four times the area of cultivated land, the Duck Creek
Irrigation Company was getting only 2.85 second feet. But
under the lower court's decree at this stage of the flow,
the company would only get a priority of two second feet
for its approximately four hundred fifty acres of cultivated
land, while plaintiff not only would get the 1.13 second feet
of Big Springs water for his one hundred acres of pasture
land, but would also pro-rate on the .85 second feet of water above the Duck Creek Dam. With the the low-water
flow increased, the situation would be alike indefensible
and would convert the prior rights of Duck Creek, unquestioned at all times until recent years, into a qualified, limited right at the expense of the stockholders and to the direct gain of plaintiff.
We shall only refer to our principal brief in connection
with respondent's argument that Stevens irrigated more
than one hundred acres of pasture land, and sixty-eight
acres of cultivated land. We believe it clearly appears that
instead of sixty-eight acres, Stevens in no one season irrigated more than thirty acres of grain, and this had a Strawberry water right also, and all of this was after 1906. The
acres referred to by respondent from Stevens' testimony
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were during very recent years and were cumulative rather
than in any one year, and if any Duck Creek water was
used thereon, it was out of surplus or high water, during
the early part of the season. No appropriation could be
founded on such testimony.
No right to ditches leading from the Duck Creek Dam was
established by plaintiff.

On this branch of respondent's argument, we will avoid
repetition and refer to our Statement of Facts and to our
discussion on pages 77 to 81 of our principal brief. There
is one new matter that is injected-the decree in the case
of A. H. Raleigh v. A. J. Stewart, Jr., et al. This has absolutely no bearing on any ditches involved in this case.
The water right involved was from the Springs on the
south of Duck Creek which enter Duck Creek below
the Duck Creek Dam and above the Stevens Dam. The
Findings in this case describe the property involved as lying south and principally west from the quarter section
corner between sections 30 and 31, which is the land under
the Stevens Dam and entirely different than any area plaintiff claims he has a right to water from the Duck Creek
Dam.
The Findings and Decree refer specifically to
Springs, which we have called the Big Springs area, and
which we have shown plaintiff gets below the Duck Creek
Dam. Our point has been that this water is available for
plaintiff's use on the one hundred acres of pasture land
watered from the Stevens Dam, which is conceded and we
do not question plaintiff's rights to the ditches from the
Stevens Dam. What we say is that no ditch rights from
the Duck Creek Dam have been shown by plaintiff through
grant, prescription or otherwise. The "slough or slough
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springs" mentioned in the Raleigh Decree are the Payson
Slough or Big Springs and have no reference to Duck
Creek.
Duck Crook Irrigation Company has not only an unqualified right to the use of water through the Upper Dam, but
through the Duck Creek Dam, being a total priority of at
least eight second feet during the irrigation season, together with a reasonable diversion of higher water during
the early season.
Under the corresponding heading of respondent's argument arriving at a different conclusion, he considers that
the company has unquestioned priority at the Upper Dam
but contends that the two second feet awarded by the trial
court satisfies such priority. He disregards the established
fact that the priority of the company is, and always has
been, at both dams as against any lower users. As between the stockholders of the company, it was recognized
that the Upper Dam had first claim, but both rights go
back before 1870 and have been recognized and administered ever since as against all lower users, and the division
between the two dams has been solely under the control
of the company and its predecessors. Sometimes, all of
the water would be taken at the Upper Dam, sometimes at
the Duck Creek Dam and no one except the company and
its predecessors had any voice in this
There are about one hundred fifty acres of cultivated
land under the Upper Dam and more than three hundred
acres of cultivated land under the Duck Creek Dam. Even
taking respondent's argument at its face value, two second
feet in priority would be entirely insufficient for the conceded priority at the Upper Dam, since the flow available
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there decreases during the irrigation season to a much
smaller amount, and Jacob's testimony on duty of water
envisaged a constant flow. For example, Jacob's June
measurement showed .83 of a second foot at the Upper
Dam, insufficient for even half of the land there. With
the irregular flow, it is a fair inference that the duty would
be nearer fifty acres per second foot, which would give
the Upper Dam three second feet and the Lower Dam at
least six. An unqualified priority at both dams of eight
second feet is inadequate but with a reasonable division of
water in excess of that amount also the stockholders can
survive. With less than that, they will be irreparably injured. The Duck Creek Dam users have just as great a
claim to priority as against plaintiff as the Upper Dam.
There has never before been any limitation as to the
amount of water the Upper Dam uses to the extent of their
needs, except by agreement with the lower stockholders.
How can respondent deny the priority of one dam when
he must, of necessity, concede the priority of the other,
the water always having been divided by the company and
its predecessors between the two as the respective necessities indicated, independent of any claims of plaintiff and
his predecessors? With such unqualified priority at both
dams, the supply even then has proved inadequate. It is
completely unjustified to limit that priority to less than
eight second feet.
Pasture land and drains.

Respondent infers that the irrigation of pasture land
is as important as that for cultivated crops. Pasture land
is usually taken care of by high or excess water, as the
record shows is the case here. It would be unthinkable
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that farmers who have f-ounded a community on the basis
of cultivated crops should be crowded out by the unauthorized extension of a high water use for pasturage. With
further reference to pasturage, we call attention to the
fact that Stevens' lower land had a problem of too much
water rather than too little by reason of sub-surface drainage. Respondent attempts to make a point that the upper
drains have changed this situation. We do not think the
record supports this contention and rather shows that there
are big drains through Stevens' own land, which is included
in the drainage district. These are the drains which affect his own land and yet, he is apparently content to have
them remain.
The plaintiff has availabl~ not only the excess and
run-off water from the company ditches but the drains on
his land. The company has filed on the upper drains and
they are an integral part of its rights, as the water draining into Duck Creek naturally was prior to the construction of the drains. They have used the water as a part of
Duck Creek under claim of right for many years. Whether
its rights are deemed by virtue of its underground water
claims or by reason of its right to the flow of Duck Creek
as such, it seems clear that its claims are paramount to any
pleaded or other claims of plaintiff. The drainage district
makes no claim and its default was entered.
Respondent's cross-appeal
The respondent devotes the last five pages of his
to points of his purported cross-appeal. What has
said in our principal and this brief we believe meets
of these points.
We should add that this is not a case where the
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been
most
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of damages was reserved. It may be true that a party
may have a right to demand a trial by jury on legal issues
or to ask for equitable issues to be resolved first, but we
have no such case here. The entire case was submitted to
the court and both sides without qualification rested in
the first instance (T. 823) .. The court thereafter ordered
that additional parties be brought in, and the pleadings
were completed as to these, and a further hearing held.
Thereupon, all parties rested (T. 936) and the case was
argued to the court, taken under advisement and a decision
made by the court. There is nothing involved here but a
failure of proof as to damages. There was no motion to
reopen, no request for a reservation of issues or any other
matter on which error coud be predicated. It might just
as well be contended that in any equity case, error can be
predicated by a party on his own failure or inability to offer
evidence of damage.
We think the court erred not in limiting the amount
of cultivated land plaintiff was permitted to irrigate to 68
acres, but in finding that the plaintiff had the right to irrigate any cultivated land from the Duck Creek Dam as
against the defendant company. We think this point has
been sufficiently argued.
It may be noted that as against Payne and Lindstrom,
propably no cross-appeal lies, since they did not participate
in the initial appeal. It might properly require an initial
appeal by plaintiff to raise any error in the award to them.
However, we do not think the court erred in awarding
Lindstrom and Payne the high water rights it did. Lindstrom may not have shown any use prior to 1903, but neither did the plaintiff from the Duck Creek Dam. If anything, the court erred in making Lindstrom's high-water
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right subject to plaintiff's. The basic error of the court
was in awarding to plaintiff any rights whatsoever out of
the Duck Creek Dam and particularly any low-water right.
It is in no position to complain because Lindstrom or Payne
was awarded a right subject to his. If Lindstrom has no
high-water right out of the Duck Creek Dam, then certainly the plaintiff is not entitled to even a high-water
right.
As to Payne, the evidence shows that he is successor
in interest to Eliza Stewart, and as heretofore pointed out,
his was the land upon which J. W. Stewart testified that
the use of water was made for which plaintiff now claims
an appropriation prior to 1903. His right is far superior
to any right that plaintiff may lay claim to and we think
that Payne should have been awarded a right superior to
any high-water right of plaintiff at the Duck Creek Dam.
We think that plaintiff's claim at the Duck Creek Dam
should be denied by this Court, which should have the effect of making Payne's claim secondary only to the company's right at that point, in which position Payne has
authorized us to indicate his joinder. We respect the forebearance of Lindstrom and Payne as an officer and former
officer of the company in electing to assert no right as
against the company notwithstanding that Payne, as successor in interest to Eliza Stewart, might maintain with
much force that he has a primary right at the Duck Creek
Dam, and Lindstrom has shown a right at least equal to
the plaintiff. But this would not justify the denial to them
of at least the high-water right recognized by the trial
court, subject to the company's right.
The very argument that Lindstrom has established no
high-water right since his additional use was initiated after
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1903, is in essence a confession that plaintiff has no right
at the Duck Creek dam, based as it is entirely on Stevens'
use after 1906. We submit on behalf of these parties and
with their authorization that if a high-water right be recognized by this Court at the Duck Creek Dam in favor of
plaintiff, the right of Lindstrom with equal priority should
be recognized and the superior right of Payne recognized,
subject to the rights of Duck Creek Irrigation Company,
against which they make no claim.
This being a suit in equity, the awarding of costs was
discretionary with the court, whether the Ruies of Civil
Procedure be considered or the statute previously in force
(Rule 54[d] [1] U.R.C.P.), 104-44-4, U.C.A., 1943.
The plaintiff claimed in his complaint a right to a large
quantity of water, with priority over the defendant company. He could hardly be considered the prevailing party
even though this were not a suit in equity. It could with
as much force be contended that the court shouid have
awarded costs to the company. The court did not abuse
its discretion.
Conclusion

Without reiteration, we invite attention to our main
brief, which seems to cover other arguments advanced by
respondent. The plaintiff's grounds of cross-appeal should
be denied. Th~ judgment of the lower court should be
modified to award to the defendant company at least eight
cubic feet of water per second from the Upper and Duck
Creek Dams as an unqualified right paramount to any
claims of plaintiff, with an additional high-water right in
conformity with the irrigater acreage under iti in relation
to the acreage shown by the evidence to be under the Ste-
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vens' Dam, after the Stevens' Dam is charged with the water entering Duck. Creek from the Big Springs area below
the Duck Creek Dam, as· is more fully discussed hereinbefore and in our former brief. .
Respectfully submitted,
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
Duck Creek Irrigation Co.
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